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Abstract
Purpose: Advancements in technology, changing customer demands or new market entrants are often 
seen as a necessary condition to trigger the creation of new Business Models, or disruptive change in exist-
ing ones. Yet, the sufficient condition is often determined by pricing and how customers are willing to pay 
for the technology (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). As a consequence, much research on Business 
Models has focused on innovation and technology management (Rajala et al., 2012; Zott et al., 2011), and 
software-specific frameworks for Business Models have emerged (Popp, 2011; Rajala et al., 2003; Rajala et 
al., 2004; Stahl, 2004). This paper attempts to illustrate Business Model change in the software industry.
Design: Drawing on Rajala et al. (2003), this case study explores the (1) antecedents and (2) consequences 
of a Business Model-change in a logistics software company. The company decided to abolish their profit-
able fee-based licensing for an internet-based version of its core product and to offer it as freeware includ-
ing unlimited service. 
Findings: Firstly, we illustrate how external developments in technology and customer demands (pricing), 
as well as the desire for a sustainable Business Model, have led to this drastic change. Secondly, we initially 
find that much of the company’s new Business Model is congruent with the company-focused framework 
of Rajala et al. (2003) [product strategy; distribution model, services and implementation; revenue logic]. 
Value: The existing frameworks for Business Models in the software industry cannot fully explain the 
disruptive change in the Business Model. Therefore, we suggest extending the framework by the element 
of ‘innovation’.
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Introduction 
During the last two decades, Business Models have 
attracted considerable attention both from research 
and practice. A major focus has been on innovation 
and technology management (Chesbrough and Rosen-
bloom, 2002; Rajala et al., 2012; Zott et al., 2011). Ra-
jala et al. (2003) emphasize that most research in the 
software industry has  focused on product develop-
ment, financing, and product life cycles or the industry 
as a whole or within defined Business Models. Some 
authors argue that the Business Model of the company 
should be revisited regularly (Johnson et al., 2008) and 
that its operative tactics have to be adapted to chang-
ing environmental conditions (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Ricart, 2010; Rajala et al., 2012). 
However, the definition of a Business Model in the soft-
ware industry, as well as its exact pattern of changes 
are puzzling issues for both practitioners and acade-
mics, and there are only few attempts to address this 
particular topic. Popp (2011) seeks to explain some soft-
ware companies successes by applying hybrid Business 
Models where the software company is acting both as 
an inventor and as an lessor. Rajala et al (2012) study 
the effects of applying open innovation to the soft-
ware Business Model. Open innovation is here defined 
as shared internal and external (customers) innovation. 
Advancements in technology, changing customer de-
mands or new market entrants are often seen as a nec-
essary condition to trigger the creation of new business 
models (Business Models) or disruptive change in ex-
isting ones. Yet, the sufficient condition is often deter-
mined by pricing and customers’ willingness to pay for 
the technology (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002) 
which is identified through an increased tendency of 
freeware strategies (Haruvy and Prasad, 2005; Riehle, 
2012). As a consequence, much research on Business 
Models has focused on innovation and technology 
management (Zott et al., 2011), and software-specific 
frameworks for Business Models have emerged (Rajala 
et al., 2003). Building on this previous evidence (esp. 
Rajala et al., 2003; Rajala and Westerlund, 2007), the 
focus of this paper is twofold. First, we attempt to fur-
ther identify the elements of a Business Model in the 
software industry. Second, we aim at identifying the 
antecedents that lead to a Business Model change and 
then assess the consequences of this change. We pose 
the overall research question: “What are elements of a 
Business Model in the software industry, and what are 
the antecedents and consequences of a Business Model 
change in the software industry?” 
To investigate this question, we conduct a case study 
at the Danish division of a small Norwegian company 
(APOLLON) specialized in outbound logistics software. 
We want to explain how the Business Model of the 
software company has evolved over APOLLON’s life 
span, what caused the recent changes in the Business 
Model, and what the consequences and future oppor-
tunities are. Drawing on Rajala et al. (2003), this case 
study explores the (1) antecedents and (2) consequen-
ces of a Business Model-change in a logistics software 
company. The company decided to abolish their profit-
able fee-based licensing for an internet-based version 
of its core product and to offer it as freeware including 
unlimited service.
Firstly, we illustrate how external developments in 
technology and customer demands (pricing), as well 
as the desire for sustainability of the Business Model, 
have led to this drastic change. Secondly, we initially 
find that much of the company’s new Business Model 
is congruent with the company-focused framework 
of Rajala et al. (2003) [product strategy; distribution 
model, services and implementation; revenue logic]. 
Nevertheless, the framework cannot fully explain the 
disruptive change in the Business Model. Constantly 
changing market conditions forces software compa-
nies to continuously rethink their Business Model. 
Therefore, we argue in line with Zott et al. (2011) to ex-
tend the framework of Rajala et al. (2003) by the ele-
ment of ‘innovation’ (also see the more recent source 
of Rajala et al., 2012).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
section 2 depicts the theoretical background of Busi-
ness Models in the software industry. Section 3 ex-
plains the advantages and limitations of our chosen 
methodology, i.e., a case study. Section 4 presents our 
findings. We critically assess the case in section 5, and 
also emphasize our contributions and avenues for fu-
ture research. 
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Business Models in the software 
industry
The literature offers a wide range of definitions for a 
Business Model (e.g., Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002; Magretta, 2002; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). 
Zott et al. (2011) structure this literature on Business 
Models since the first appearance of the concept in 
the 1990s. They find that three fields of research have 
emerged, which are (1) innovation in Business Models, 
(2) strategic aspects and performance management, 
and (3) e-business including information technology. 
As a finding across all three fields, they summarize that 
Business Models are individually tailored to companies 
and the environment in which they operate. Despite the 
importance of Business Models in connection with in-
formation technology, conceptualizations of Business 
Models in the software industry are so far non-existing. 
A notable exception are Rajala et al. (2003) who build 
theory from five case studies they conducted in the 
software industry (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). Based on their empirical findings, 
they suggest that a Business Model in the software 
industry comprises the interdependent elements of a 
product strategy; a revenue logic; a distribution model; 
and a service and implementation model. Competitors, 
resources, shareholders and customers are seen as di-
rect stakeholders, who—however—operate outside the 
company’s business model. We will apply this frame-
work to APOLLON, see Figure 1 for details. 
Figure 1: Elements of a Business Model (Rajala et al., 2003)
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Rajala and Westerlund (2007) suggest that these four 
elements of a Business Models can be combined differ-
ently and thereby select a space along the two contin-
ua of Degree of involvement of customer relationships 
and the level of the homogeneity of the offering. The 
resulting four high/low combinations indicate four fea-
sible Business Models in the software industry. These 
include Software project businesses  (Type I) with high 
level of product customization and close client-com-
pany relationships; System solutions businesses  (Type 
II) with high level of customer involvement combined 
with a highly standardized product; Transactional ser-
vices and semi-finished solutions (Type III), which nor-
mally serve as a platform for a bigger value creation 
framework to a small number of clients and typically as 
a part of a network; and last, Standard offerings (Type 
IV), with low involvement in a customer relationships 
and economies of scale due to homogeneity. We will 
classify APOLLON in this framework and depict the 
four Business Models in Figure 2.
Methodology
Research Method 
We opted to conduct an explanatory case study in a 
single company, which allows us to understand the 
phenomenon of Business Models in its real-life context 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000; Scapens, 1990). It is our goal 
to understand how exactly the elements of a Business 
Model work together in the software industry, and to 
illustrate practices from the field (Ryan et al., 2002). 
Thereby, we are open for interpretations that would 
lead us to adjust or further contribute to the theories 
that explain the phenomena under investigation (Arb-
nor and Bjerke, 2008; Lukka and Modell, 2010). 
Data collection
We draw on three sources of data to illustrate our case: 
interviews, observations and archival data. Our first 
and primary sources are two interviews with carefully 
selected key informants. The first interview was 
conducted with the CEO of APOLLON’s Danish division. 
We selected him for his thorough understanding 
of the international software market, his long 
experience, and his holistic overview of all operations 
in the company. Additionally, we conducted a phone 
interview with a sales representative in order to gain 
a better understanding of the direct interactions 
with customers (Ryan et al., 2002). By selecting key 
informants from different hierarches within the 
company, we also follow the call of Morgeson et al. 
(2010) for more multi-level case study research that 
provides a deeper understanding of the researched 
Figure 2 Classification of different types of business models in the software industry (Rajala and Westerlund, 2007; Rajala et al., 
2004)
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phenomena. Interviews included mostly open-
ended questions, and were semi-structured where 
we asked elaborating questions when appropriate. 
Interviews were originally conducted in Danish and 
lasted approximately one hour each. They were tape-
recorded, transcribed and analyzed for patterns. 
Quotes in the text are our own translations into English 
(Bouchard, 1976; Brislin et al., 1973; Oppenheim, 1992). 
We did not predetermine the number of interviews but 
stopped when we felt saturated (Flick, 2002; Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). Our first hint toward saturation was 
that the key informants started to only reinforce what 
we had found out through external analysis of the 
company beforehand. Second, we did not notice any 
contradicting evidence during our observations, which 
lent validity to the data. Third, we carefully selected the 
most knowledgeable key informants in the company 
such as the CEO; it is highly unlikely that there are 
other informants that would be more knowledgeable 
on a topic like APOLLON’s Business Model.
 
Second, we use observations as a source of data that 
were gathered during our visits at the company site. 
These data sources include our general impressions 
of the research site; participation in diverse meetings; 
interaction of employees; the times that employees 
needed to perform tasks; the location and conditions of 
the building; work space arrangements and furnishing 
of offices; observations on the technology products of 
the company and the presentation on products given 
by APOLLON’s managers. This data is very fuzzy, and 
we analyzed them by identifying patterns through dis-
cussions in our research group (Yin, 2009).
Third, we collected archival data on the company to 
corroborate our interviews and observations. We did 
this by asking APOLLON’s management for documen-
tation, and we also searched what was publicly avail-
able on the internet. These archival sources include 
internal documents, brochures, bulletins, annual re-
port, reviews, presentation materials, and APOLLON’s 
website. Again, we analyzed the data through pattern 
matching in group discussions (Yin, 2009). They sup-
port our understanding of APOLLONs specific situation. 
Limitations
This study has limitations that need to be considered. 
As this is a single company case study, it might not 
be generalizable beyond the specific parameters of its 
context, such as its industry, the company size, or the 
competitive situation in which this Business Model has 
emerged. Moreover, we only investigated the Danish 
division of APOLLON. Though the research and devel-
opment department is situated in Romania, the small 
size of the company and the fluent and transversal 
communication existing across the national depart-
ments enables us to identify and discuss the compa-
ny’s product development processes which are essen-
tial for the Business Model understanding. Last, this 
study mainly focuses on the Business Model. Future 
studies could focus more on the external, competitive 
environment.
Despite the limitations, we aim for sufficient validity 
and reliability (Ryan et al., 2002): We ensure construct 
validity by using established frameworks and defini-
tions on Business Models to reason for our results. 
Internal validity is increased by corroborating diverse 
sources of data. As to external validity, we already 
alerted that this study has an explanatory, illustrative 
character and ask for careful consideration when gen-
eralizing our conclusion. Last, we consider reliability by 
depicting our research protocol. 
Findings
The software company APOLLON1 was founded in Nor-
way in 1997 and expanded with national divisions to 
Denmark (2002), Sweden (2008) and Finland (2011). 
National divisions are in charge of selling, marketing 
and supporting APOLLON’s main product, DISPATCH. 
DISPATCH tracks consignments. We will elaborate on 
the products in section 4.1. The Danish division em-
ploys 20 people. The programming department, where 
a majority of the coding and product development is 
done, is located in Romania and has 23 employees. 
APOLLON operates in a niche market for outbound-lo-
gistics software. It has approximately 8,000 customers 
of which 1,600 are located in Denmark. APOLLON has 
only small and insignificant competitors in Denmark 
that have about 100 customers’ altogether. Yet, APOL-
LON estimates that it just has 15% of the total possible 
market. Supposedly, there are still about 9,000 Danish 
1  We changed the name of the company and its products to offer 
more anonymity. 
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companies who could switch from their in-house soft-
ware solution to the DISPATCH product family.
Product strategy
The Product Strategy of APOLLON revolves around a 
product family, of which DISPATCH is the core. DIS-
PATCH helps companies to manage their outbound lo-
gistics. All other products are built on it or are comple-
mentary. We also describe the recent changes to the 
product strategy. DISPATCH targets large company as 
customers who run an ERP-system, where DISPATCH 
gets invisibly integrated. The software accesses the 
widely different IT-systems of the customer’s carri-
ers. It is pre-programed to automatically comply with 
the varying demands of known carriers, such as their 
complex printing formats. Thereby, DISPATCH decreas-
es human errors, lowers the risk of delays and saves 
time by automatic compliance, avoidance of entering 
data twice, and one integrated ERP-system. As a re-
cent change, APOLLON added the ‘DISPATCH Portal’ 
feature, which enables senders and receivers to trac 
the consignment via an online portal. Another recently 
added feature is DISPATCH FileDrop. FileDrop enables 
customers to ‘drag and drop’ files created by the ERP-
system and to use them DISPATCH. This is the sim-
plest solution as no integration with the ERP-system 
is necessary. 
APOLLON has recently introduced several new prod-
ucts: The recently added products ‘DISPATCH ONLINE’, 
‘DISPATCH MOBILE’, and ‘DISPATCH ScanApp’ focus on 
a different customer group. ONLINE has the exact same 
features as the parallel existing product DISPATCH, the 
only difference being that it runs fully online. Thereby, 
it targets a new customer base that does not have an 
ERP-system, especially small, newly started compa-
nies, often web-shops. 
MOBILE has also been recently added to the product 
group. It targets the completely new customer seg-
ments that lack the financial strength to afford their 
own system: small carriers, i.e., the companies that 
APOLLON’s current customers work with to ship their 
own products. By establishing business relations with 
them, APOLLON locks them in and thereby protects its 
Business Model against potential new entrants. Scan-
App is the online version of MOBILE and also targets 
small carriers. Thereby, APOLLONs product strategy is 
gradually changing from a traditional product approach 
aiming at a well-established customer segment to a 
diversified product approach aiming at a different cus-
tomer segment with new types of products. 
Revenue logic
As APOLLON has currently no competitor in Denmark ex-
cept for in-house solutions for outbound-logistics soft-
ware, it has relatively high discretion in pricing. APOL-
LON’s sources of revenues are one-time installations as 
well as monthly fees from customers using DISPATCH. 
The cost installation for DISPATCH varies according to 
the number of days APOLLON employees are at the cus-
tomer’s site, the hourly rate for external consultants, the 
number of printers, and the sophistication of desired in-
tegration (FileDrop, SQL or API). The monthly fee paid 
for DISPATCH varies with the number of consignments 
per year. Licenses range from up to 2,000 until 50,000 
consignments per year. Each license covers one location 
and an unlimited number of users, along with unlimited 
service and support on phone or email. 
APOLLON operates profitably and its revenues exceed 
its costs by far. The costs structure has three main cat-
egories: First, there are development costs. A software 
product is the fact that it requires large investments 
in the development of software, and  low or non-ex-
istent marginal cost afterwards (Shapiro and Varian, 
1998).  Despite the fact that DISPATCH was initially 
developed by the division in Romania, the Danish di-
vision contributed substantially to the developments 
of ONLINE, PORTAL and ScanApp. A second major 
cost category is the helpdesk to which all customers 
have unlimited access to foster high loyalty. The third 
cost category is the administrative expenses,  includ-
ing office rent, traveling, salaries, marketing mate-
rial, and PR related expenses. 
It is highly noteworthy that—to get access to new 
customer segment of smaller companies—APOLLON 
made a radical rupture in its Business Model. Now, it 
gives away a newer, more modern version (ONLINE) of 
its highly profitable older core product (DISPATCH) for 
free. Astonishingly, APOLLON also grants the same, 
free service and maintenance to all of these non-pay-
ing customers. This try-before-you-buy has been a 
fundamentally new paradigm for APOLLON. The deci-
sion to create this online version of the product was 
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associated with the decision to target new customer 
segments, i.e. to cover small and medium size compa-
nies in addition to large businesses they used to have 
as clients. Among others, the differences between the 
two solutions are the lack integration into customers’ 
ERP system and easy access to the system via the in-
ternet. Moreover, online version does not require man-
power to install the system and train the staff. As for 
the try-before-you-buy option, it was not offered for 
the APOLLON users, and it is not available to every-
one, but rather to small newly established businesses, 
who might become their potential clients. This is a 
major difference to similar Business Models like Gil-
lette, where the product (razor) is free but customers 
are charged for the maintenance (blades) (Johnson et 
al., 2008; Zott and Amit, 2010). However, by offering 
the product and service for free for smaller companies, 
APOLLON thereby create sustainable value for these 
companies, as said by the CEO: 
“The idea is to capture the small customers who 
are just starting their businesses. They don’t 
have any capital, so we have a Business Model 
that can assist in that particular situation.” 
ONLINE is already popular in Norway, and the Dan-
ish market is expected to pick up. From the limited 
data available, it seems as if approximately 90% of 
ONLINE-customers default within one year. While 
the marginal cost of the product is irrelevant, APOL-
LON never recovers the incurred costs of service and 
maintenance. APOLLON tries to retain the remaining 
10% of surviving customers. As they grow, APOLLON 
charges them as soon as they reach a certain number 
of consignments. APOLLON anticipates that custom-
ers—who felt well-treated in the past by having access 
to all features for free as well as unlimited service—will 
stick to APOLLON’s products later. The network effect 
as well as switching costs would suggest this opportu-
nity. Having introduced new products to new customer 
segments, APOLLON has switched its marketing strat-
egy from concentrated to diversification integrated 
new products in new markets (Ansoff, 1958). This ex-
act phenomenon is closely linked to that of innovation 
(Ansoff, 1968). Accessing a new market (i.e. the small 
companies) through a new channel (the internet) us-
ing a different strategy (freeware) is increasingly com-
mon among software suppliers (Riehle, 2012) and can 
be categorized as a commercial open source Business 
Model with the aim of gaining revenue at a later point 
in time when the free open source does no longer pro-
vide the full utility (Riehle, 2012). This type of Business 
model is often seen within the software industry and 
examples are Linux, MySQL, Apache and Eclipse (Ebert, 
2007). Another example is Skype who offers free calls 
online, but have a variety of additional features that 
cost a little such as phone calls to land lines and busi-
ness group video calls (Skype, 2013).
Distribution model (marketing and 
sales)
The marketing of APOLLON has changed from tradi-
tional advertising to a network-based ambassadorship. 
In the sales division, APOLLON has switched from in-
formal customer contacts to a more formalized CRM-
system. We describe the changes in the following.
As to previous marketing practices, APOLLON has re-
lied heavily on traditional advertising to market its 
products during its first years in Denmark, such as 
newspaper advertisement. Besides the high costs in-
curred, APOLLON did not see the return-on-marketing 
for these initiatives. Advertisements did not target the 
right customers in the appropriate way. Most of the 
successful sales were either made to customers who 
APOLLON identified and contacted directly (push strat-
egy). Another marketing initiative that APOLLON still 
pursues is the use of an external PR consultant who 
tries to get APOLLON into the media with topics that 
are not necessarily related to its products, e.g., as an 
innovative employer in the Danish market.
Marketing practices have changed over the last three 
years. As APOLLON established itself more in the Dan-
ish market, customers independently contacted APOL-
LON as they were referred to the DISPATCH product by 
their carriers. This led APOLLON to stop advertising and 
to switch to a pull-strategy that involves ‘ambassadors’. 
APOLLON defines an ambassador as someone that can 
credibly recommend the DISPATCH product family to a 
company, such as carriers, sellers of ERP-software, and 
logistics experts who switch jobs. By using ambassadors, 
APOLLON also hopes to get access to SMEs. However, 
we did not identify initiatives that allowed APOLLON to 
actively steer this ambassadorial process. 
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Concerning sales, APOLLON employees a sales force 
of four people (out of 20). In the beginning, the sales 
pitches were informal and relied strongly on the char-
acteristics of the sales person. As it grew to 20 employ-
ees, APOLLON found that sharing knowledge about 
product features became increasingly difficult. This led 
to a formalized customer relationship management 
(CRM). For instance, it comprises the mode of contact, 
information packages for the customer, sales demon-
stration, technical requirements, and documentation 
of the customer relationship. 
Introducing the new online and mobile products aiming 
at the small entrepreneurial customers, the marketing 
and sales can be linked to the revenue logic; by giving 
the new products away for free is in fact a specific mar-
keting and sales technique which is also highlighted by 
the CEO 
“The idea of focusing on the small startups is 
to capture them later in their development. It 
is marketing, a way of capturing customers”.
 
It is an investment in potential customers just like tra-
ditional marketing costs, and this is exactly how APOL-
LON sees it. 
Services and implementation model
Service and CRM are essential parts of APOLLON’s 
Business Model because APOLLON generates most of 
its revenues from existing customers. The number of 
customers has not grown substantially over the last 
3 years, but APOLLON has successfully managed to 
increase revenues from the existing customers. The 
stalled growth, however, is a problem for the sustain-
ability of the Business Model, given that competitors 
might be interested in entering the market, and only 
15% of the whole market potential is yet accessed. As 
described, APOLLON attempts to gain a larger market 
share during the next years with its new products. 
Customers have unlimited access to service and main-
tenance free of charge, as the CEO implies: 
“Of course we create profit from our software, 
but ultimately we create a good profit because 
we provide good customer service.” 
The employees in the service department are evaluated 
based on a “customers served ratio”, which encourages 
the quick resolution of problems and shortens waiting 
time for the customers in line. While new customers 
naturally require service more often, there is no sign that 
companies make excessive use of the service. On aver-
age, APOLLON provides service to a customer four times 
a year, where the service load is highest after the regular 
updates of the software. To underscore the importance 
of service, we observed that the number of employees in 
the service department (8)—a cost center—is twice as high 
as the revenue-generating sales department (4). Also, 
the service department occupies the most prominent and 
central office space at APOLLON. However, this may very 
well be linked to both product and marketing strategy. 
The service provided is part of the knowledge based prod-
uct. Likewise, the service provided is a further sustainable 
marketing approach used to keep the customers. 
Innovation
So far, we have documented how the Business Model 
of APOLLN has evolved over the past 10 years. Specifi-
cally, we have emphasized substantial changes in the 
product strategy, the revenue logic, and the distribu-
tion model. Nevertheless, our chosen framework from 
Rajala et al. (2003) cannot explain why these chang-
es happened. We therefore suggest expanding this 
framework by the element of ‘innovation’ as suggested 
by Zott et al. (2011), because innovation happens due 
to external and internal impulses (also see the more re-
cent work of Rajala et al., 2012). 
External impulses: Customer focus
Innovation in the product strategy received impulses 
from the sales force. They described the customer 
needs and thereby provided the basis for new products 
like PORTAL or MOBILE. They were supported by the 
service department, whose employees could contribute 
experiences with problems that customers frequently 
encountered. This way, APOLLON could not only satis-
fy current needs of customers but also anticipate their 
current necessities. This phenomena can be referred to 
what Zott (2011) describes as a commercialization of 
innovative ideas and technologies where free products 
becomes part of the innovation process and commer-
cialization.
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The revenue logic is further connected to this type 
of innovation, and the case study shows a changing 
revenue model due to external impulses. Sales rep-
resentatives and top management suggested that 
also carriers could be targeted as customers. Another 
change was that the previously profitably sold product 
DISPATCH was released in a more modern and better 
version (ONLINE) but then given away for free, includ-
ing all necessary service and maintenance. This—at 
first sight—counterintuitive move will grant APOLLON 
a stronger position in the market, more market share, 
more locked-in customers, and higher customer loyal-
ty. The idea also signals that in order to access SMEs, 
APOLLON has to adjust to the initially weak cash flows 
of these SMEs and postpone generating revenue to a 
later stage. 
Innovations in distribution were moreover triggered 
by external impulses. APOLLON closely observed how 
DISPATCH spread in the market, how new custom-
ers heard about it, and how the decisions to buy were 
made. This led to the abandonment of advertisement 
(push marketing) and the introduction of ambassadors 
(pull marketing). 
Internal impulses: Knowledge sharing
The external impulses for innovation had to be pro-
cessed by APOLLON through internal knowledge shar-
ing or open innovation (Rajala et al., 2012). Knowledge 
sharing occurs informally, e.g. through the culture of 
openness, egalitarianism and communication that 
APOLLON’s top management promotes. 
Formalized processes include the monthly “Second 
Friday Meeting” that takes an efficient 90 minutes 
only. The intention of the meeting is that employees 
understand what is going on in the company, and to 
encourage debates and dialogues beyond the meet-
ing. Typical topics include the explanation of financial 
and non-financial key performance indicators by CEO 
and CFO, state of affairs with new or large custom-
ers, practical problems of everyday work, and product-
related improvements. Also, APOLLON has joined this 
electronic platform ‘Yammer’ to facilitate knowledge 
exchange within and across all divisions in Scandina-
via and Romania, and the headquarters in Norway. The 
high degree of innovation processes in APOLLON is fur-
ther sustained by both the CEO and his assistant: 
“[…] I would definitely highlight that we test 
A LOT of different things. And there are many 
things which do not succeed of course, but 
then there are other things where we prove 
ourselves and we can see that we are really 
good. We are quick in capturing new ideas, 
but also quick in testing them.” 
Exactly these elements highlight a sustainable and 
integrated degree of innovation in the organizational 
culture. 
Discussion
This study addresses elements of a Business Model as 
well as the antecedents and consequences of a Business 
Model change in the software industry. Following the 
framework of Rajala et al. (2003), we demonstrate how 
changes in technology, shifting customer demands as 
well as the possibility of new market entrants change 
the Business Model of a software company, specifically 
its product strategy, its revenue model towards turn-
ing profitable core products into freeware, as well as 
its distribution model. In the following, we will discuss 
if APOLLON has successfully managed to switch from 
its previous Business Model to a new one (Rajala and 
Westerlund, 2007), and what its future opportunities 
and challenges are. 
The current and future challenges 
for APOLLON
Relating to Rajala and Westerlund’s (2007) four sug-
gested Business Models in the software industry, our 
analysis suggests that APOLLON has moved from a 
type IV Business Model (standard offerings business) 
to a type II Business Model (system solution busi-
ness). The latter implies offering of uniform core solu-
tion (DISPATCH) that can be modified for customers 
through modular components. But APOLLON still has 
some characteristics of its previous Business Model. Ac-
cording to Popp (2011), multiple Business Model charac-
teristics—defined as a hybrid Business Model—are often 
necessary within the software industry. However, this 
type of hybrid Business Model refers to the dual value 
creation of software companies’ product strategy: the 
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software as a product and the software as a service. 
In this respect, APOLLON has a well-defined hybrid 
Business Model with a high level of service and exper-
tise offered to the customers, along with sustainable 
software products. Regarding the revenue logic and 
customer segmentation, we suggest that APOLLON 
should focus on a type II Business Model by improving 
its capabilities on the two decisive factors of Business 
Model choice in the software industry: the level of ho-
mogeneity of offering and the degree of involvement in 
customer relationships (Rajala and Westerlund, 2007):
To begin with, APOLLON achieved higher profitability 
with their new Business Model. The increase in costs 
for additional sales staff had been more than recovered 
in the following year by substantially increased sales.
As to homogeneity, APOLLON has diversified its prod-
uct strategy by responding to the new internet-based 
and portable-device-related demands of customers. 
The change is not so fundamental that it could become 
a type I or III Business Model, but sufficient to give 
customers a reason to intensify their relationships. 
Rajala and Westerlund (2007) emphasize that more 
heterogeneous offerings are an appropriate solution 
for companies with a smaller number of customers 
such as APOLLON, whose Danish market is estimated 
at not more than 10,600 customers. Besides the dif-
ferent products that APOLLON currently possess, there 
are more levers of heterogeneity, such as the different 
possible integrations into ERP using SQL, API and File-
Drop. This higher degree of customization creates entry 
barriers for the competition from Sweden by increasing 
the switching costs of the customers. 
As to customer relationships, APOLLON should use 
the higher degree of customization to deepen relation-
ships. At the moment, APOLLON has contact with each 
customer on average every three month. First, CRM is a 
feasible way of increasing the frequency of these con-
tacts and to secure APOLLON a more sustainable type 
II Business Model. Second, APOLLON could improve is 
its new marketing strategy of ambassadors. While we 
agree that it seems as a clear improvement over the 
previous advertising strategy, APOLLON could employ 
more pro-active strategies to steer the development of 
its word-of-mouth networks into the right direction. 
Third, the new revenue model where MOBILE is given 
away for free needs to be secured by creating long-
term bonds to the relevant SMEs. That way, the likeli-
hood of generating future revenue increases. 
The freeware strategic option, according to the APOL-
LON model increases future revenues, but according to 
Haruvy and Prasad (2005) two additional factors play 
an increasing role in freeware solutions; it is a benefi-
cial strategy in order to deter a rival from entering the 
market and it contributes to rapid access and growth 
within a particular market. These factors are naturally 
interrelated with the long-term bond established to 
relevant SMEs. However, according to Riehle (2012) 
caution in this Business Model should be taken in this 
approach for product managers to carefully plan the 
interface of the free open access customers and the 
paying customers in order to avoid customer dissatis-
faction. The costing structure is relevant in these con-
siderations since it naturally establish the maneuver-
able possibilities for APOLLON. 
An additional challenge for APOLLON is to consider the 
type of innovation implied in their Business Model. The 
current Business Model has several closed innovation 
attributes. This means that the research and develop-
ment is internal and not open towards external stake-
holders (Rajala et al., 2012). The advantage of using a 
closed innovation mode is being the first to the mar-
ket, securing future revenues. On the contrary, an open 
innovation mode reveals research and development 
ideas, but simultaneously innovations emerges from 
stakeholders needs and APOLLON could thereby cre-
ate a more sustainable Business Model (Chesbrough, 
2003; Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007; Ebert, 2007; 
Rajala et al., 2012). Though APOLLON also indicates 
some open innovation, this could be more prominent, 
for example by sharing Yammar with the different 
freight companies or some of the major customers.
Zott (2011) identifies several areas of literature within 
business model innovation. In particular, open innova-
tion and collaborative entrepreneurship (Miles et al., 
2006) are highlighted as emergent strategies within 
knowledge based companies like APOLLON. Likewise, 
the open innovation is closely related to possibilities of 
facing Business Model changes due to an incorporated 
flexibility in the organizational culture which has been 
proven essential in sustaining global competitiveness 
(Calia et al., 2007; Rajala et al., 2012). This type of in-
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novation due to increased competition which directly 
forces organizations to change some of their core busi-
ness model is similar to evolutionary change where 
survival in a competitive environment forces organiza-
tions to adapt their business concepts accordingly (Ven 
and Poole, 1995). Though at this point, APOLLON ap-
pears to purposely adopt the freeware approach, the 
innovative approach to other markets with diversified 
products is not necessarily similar to other evolution-
ary companies like SAP who became a market leader 
through cooperation with IBM (Leimbach, 2008). Simi-
larities, however, can be found in the adaptability of 
capture opportunities at the right moments which ex-
actly represent the dynamic transformational strategy 
approach found in evolutionary business models (Demil 
and Lecocq, 2010). 
Contributions
More specifically, our study has several implications 
for Business Models in the software industry. First, we 
demonstrate that the framework of Rajala et al. (2003) 
can reasonably well describe a Business Model in the 
software industry. Our case study suggests that this 
framework should be extended by the element of In-
novation to be better able to explain where innovation 
comes from and why Business Models change. This can 
successfully be combined with elements from the Busi-
ness Model change literature which through, for exam-
ple, evolution capture some of the emergent strategies 
in software companies. Most notably, the case has il-
lustrated that the product change was induced by new 
technological possibilities and client needs, rather than 
by the general desire to be innovative in the field. This 
is because APOLLON does not face fierce competition, 
which does not require them to be highly innovative. 
We did not find any indication that APOLLON consid-
ered competitive forces or other companies’ experi-
ences. The innovation was mainly driven by technology 
and clients.
Second, we use the four Business Model types suggest-
ed by Rajala and Westerlund (2007) to categorize the 
Business Model of APOLLON. Our case study illustrates 
that the switch from one Business Model to the other 
such as APOLLON did not require a rearrangement of 
the elements of the Business Model, such as differ-
ent products, revenue models or distribution models. 
We thereby contribute that the focus on the practical 
implementation of Business Models deserves the at-
tention of future research. Additionally, this witnesses 
a neglected importance of flexibility and adaptation in 
the organizations Business Model where the Business 
Model frequently is identified as a static description of 
how the organization create value for consumers which 
partly supports the findings of Johnson, Christensen 
and Kagermann (2008), Casadesus-Masanell and Ri-
cart (2010), and Rajala, Westerlund and Møller (2012). 
This particular case has demonstrated how increased 
organizational complexity, rapid growth in software in-
dustry and lack of entry barriers to the software market 
supports a growing need for emergent strategy tools 
which should be incorporated in the Business Model 
design in order to capture a holistic approach and man-
agement control system for the organizations. 
Future research
Innovation was a central driver of change in the case 
study presented here. We suggest that this ele-
ment should be added to the framework of Rajala et 
al. (2003). Yet, there are several other elements that 
are seen either as external to a Business Model in the 
software industry, or that not mentioned yet. Future 
research could investigate such elements, e.g., the role 
of different employee capabilities, dealing with un-
certainty by the top management, or mechanisms by 
which the networks of sales representatives function. 
Conclusion
This study contributes by illustrating a Business Model 
in the software industry, as well as the antecedents and 
consequences of Business Model change. Thereby, we 
challenge existing theory in this field and suggest that 
innovation has not been sufficiently addressed when 
explaining Business Model change in the software in-
dustry. Our case study gives an example how Business 
Model change can be better understood if both the ori-
gin and the role of innovation are more appreciated. 
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